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Abstract 
 
This essay investigates the cultural significance of the construction of justice in 
an internationally successful American TV series, Dexter. The double life led by the 
eponymous protagonist, a serial killer who is also part of the Miami police, is read as 
a literal staging of the mutually foundational relationship of legitimacy and violence, 
and of the paradoxes of what Giorgio Agamben, following Jacques Derrida and 
Walter Benjamin, terms “force-of-law,” with “law” under double erasure: a state in 
which on the one hand, the law is in force but lacks the power to be enforced, and on 
the other hand, the force of law is separated from the law and associated with acts that 
suspend the law. An embodiment of vigilante culture who is also part of the legal 
police enforcement, Dexter is a figure of sovereignty as the law: he reclaims and 
enacts a form of extralegal justice predicated on the disjunction between the 
legitimate and the legal. Reading this fantasy of justice as, in Slavoj Žižek’s terms, a 
“sublime object,” the essay argues that it operates along the same lines that were 
practiced and theorized by the Bush administration in the wake of September 11, 
2001. 
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The broader intellectual context for this essay is a full-length project on crime 
and detection narratives, addressing their philosophical and political function from the 
inception of the genre to some of its more recent instantiations in post-9/11 American 
TV series. Detective fiction, I contend, is a crucial narrative technology of secular 
modernity, in that it creates a link between two fundamental notions of western 
thought, truth and justice, articulating both with modern state formations. More 
specifically, I argue that the genre operates in regard to the modern state as the 
theological and philosophical discourse of theodicy had operated in regard to God: it 
grounds the subject’s reliance on a transcendent entity in intellectual conviction, 
providing reassurance of its ultimate justice in spite of empirical evidence of evil and 
injustice in the everyday world. The genre thus forges a link between the state and the 
reader as subject-citizen, based on an infinitely reiterated (and infinitely deferred) 
promise of justice. And yet, while keeping justice constantly present as its ostensible 
object, the genre’s narrative machinery operates as a way of foreclosing the question 
of justice, by foreclosing any alternative way of thinking about justice—for instance, 
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in social rather than penal terms, and as redistribution rather than retribution.
1
 Crime 
and detective fiction as a genre thus qualifies as a modern myth in Roland Barthes’s 
sense: “myth hides nothing: its function is to distort, not to make disappear” (120). In 
this essay, I will investigate the cultural significance of the construction of justice in 
an internationally successful American TV series, Dexter.
 2
  
 
Delectable Monsters 
Dexter is a unique character: a serial killer who is also a forensic expert working 
with the police. Orphaned at the age of three and permanently damaged by the trauma 
of witnessing his mother being killed with a motorsaw by a gang of drug dealers, he 
was adopted by a police officer, Harry Morgan, who early perceived his sociopathic 
tendencies and channelled his urge to kill in what he deemed a socially useful manner. 
This is what Dexter calls “the code of Harry”: kill only people who are themselves 
murderers, take all the necessary precautions not to get caught, and lead an outer life 
of unimpeachable normalcy to conceal the inner monster. By day, Dexter Morgan is a 
blood spatter expert working for the Miami police,
3
 where his half-sister Debra also 
serves, and concealing his lack of human emotions through a carefully constructed 
façade of attentiveness to friends, to his lover and then wife Rita, and to her two 
children; by night, he is a prowler seeking out criminals who have escaped from the 
law. Untrammeled by police procedures and legal niceties, he seeks incriminating 
evidence, and once he has acquired the moral certainty of his victims’ guilt he 
captures them, tortures them to extort their confession, and kills them, disposing of 
their bodies in carefully wrapped pieces that he throws into the ocean from his boat, 
the “Slice of Life.” 
The ironic layering of meanings in the suggestively named boat may provide a 
key to the otherwise surprising success of a show centering around such gruesome 
deeds. Both the show and the series of novels by Jeff Lindsay from which it was 
adapted present us with a witty, sparklingly ironic first-person narration by the 
                                                 
1 Over the years, I have been developing some of these ideas at the “Futures of American Studies” Institute at 
Dartmouth College, where an early version of this essay was presented in 2009. I take this opportunity to (once 
again) thank the Futures director, Donald Pease and all of the Futures co-directors, faculty, and participants for the 
ongoing intellectual dialogue, which has immeasurably enriched my thinking on these issues. 
2 The show, produced by Showtime, first aired on October 1, 2006, and ran for eight seasons, until 2013. It had 
high audience ratings, mostly positive reviews, and got a number of awards and nominations. Michael C. Hall’s 
interpretation as Dexter was unanimously praised, and so were the sophistication of the camera work and 
screenwriting. The show’s concept comes from a series of novels by Jeff Lindsay, starting with Darkly Dreaming 
Dexter, of 2004; the first couple of seasons loosely follow the plot of Darkly Dreaming Dexter, while the 
subsequent ones have original plots. By way of methodological clarification, let me add that my observations in 
this essay will mainly concern the first two seasons: given the peculiar operation of TV series—where 
transformations in each subsequent season respond to such disparate factors as audience response, leading actors’ 
personal and professional demands, sponsors’ requests, need for diversification of plot and escalation of effects, 
etc.—I take the first two seasons of each series as the place where the series’ concept and implications can be 
grasped at their purest and analyzed most effectively. 
3 Miami is Jeff Lindsay’s home town, and Lindsay, interviewed by Lyz Lenz, has insisted on his sense of 
“something surreal about Florida—a beautiful sunset, a palm tree and a headless body at the bottom of the tree.” 
However, it should be noted that Florida also has prominent associations with the history of serial killing: Ted 
Bundy, one of the most (in)famous serial killers in U.S. history, committed his final murders and was finally 
captured, convicted, and executed in Florida. 
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protagonist, who is humorous, funny, smart, capable, linguistically creative—in a 
word, thoroughly likable (an effect enhanced, in the TV show, by the physical 
attractiveness of the leading actor, Michael C. Hall). Even his name, Dexter, evokes 
dexterity and denies that there is anything sinister about him. He is the “good bad 
boy” of a whole literary and filmic tradition—except, of course, that he is a serial 
killer. Remarkably, this is a fact that he never tries to disguise or diminish: he always 
describes himself exactly for what he is, he never takes an apologetic attitude, he 
never seeks justification in his childhood trauma—although other characters do it for 
him all the time, creating the predictable tale of early victimization as motive for 
crime associated with the serial killer figure in popular culture.
4
 Dexter never claims 
to have noble or idealistic motives for killing, although he follows the code of Harry 
closely and loyally as a way of keeping his urge safe for himself and acceptable to his 
father figure or Superego. And yet, as one of the great literary criminals discussed by 
Sigmund Freud—“Indeed, even great criminals and humorists, as they are represented 
in literature, compel our interest by the narcissistic consistency with which they 
manage to keep away from their ego anything that would diminish it” (89)—he even 
takes a sort of narcissistic pride in his acts: “I’m a very neat monster,” he declares in 
the first episode, a line that is taken directly from Lindsay’s novel (12). “I’ve always 
enjoyed my work. It brings order to the chaos, fills me with civic pride,” he declares 
in Episode 1 of the second season. 
This brazen and breezy exhibition of Dexter’s “civic” activities has a paradoxical 
effect: on the one hand, it reinforces Dexter’s difference from the rest of us—as he 
carefully underlines, he has no conscience, no feelings, no emotions, and he regards 
himself as not human—; on the other hand, it effects a direct interpellation of the 
reader/viewer as an accomplice and partner in crime. The moment you smile at one of 
his witty remarks you are compromised: you find him funny, you identify him as the 
hero, you find yourself condoning his acts, rooting for him, hoping he gets away with 
his murders.  
A crucial moment in this interpellation and a key to the overall operation of the 
series is offered by the opening title sequence, which has deservedly become an 
instant classic.
5
 The bloody trace left by the casual slapping of a mosquito; the blade 
poised on a throat; the drop of blood falling in the sink from a shaving cut, trickling 
along a chin, and soaking a tissue; the knife slashing a piece of uncooked meat, the 
smattering of ketchup across a fried egg, the crushing power of a coffee grinder; the 
red mist of juice produced by another knife penetrating an orange, its interior 
squeezed into a blood-red pulp; the fingers testing the resistance of dental floss, 
followed by a bare neck suggestively evoking strangling, and the hands vigorously 
                                                 
4 On the popular representation of serial killers and for a critical investigation of the appeal of this figure in 
contemporary American culture, see Seltzer. For a more historical approach, tracing the cultural implications of 
this phenomenon from the nineteenth century to the post-9/11 era, see Schmid. 
5 The opening credits sequence was created by Digital Kitchen. For another analysis of the sequence, partly 
divergent from the one I am offering here, see Karpovich.  
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pulling shoe-strings: in this sequence, a harmless morning routine is transformed into 
a deadly ritual. 
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The extreme close-up images in the opening credits have a twofold effect: on the 
one hand, they defamiliarize ordinary acts and objects, revealing their troubling 
inherent uncanniness. On the other hand, while denaturalizing daily objects and 
actions, they subtly naturalize killing, cutting, and bleeding as part of daily life. The 
perfect aestheticization of each shot, the wink at the viewer’s visual encyclopaedia 
(from Psycho to American Psycho), the elegant balance between the tension created 
around ordinary objects and the ironic deflation of threatening signals into 
reassuringly recognizable ones, create a masterful effect of unsettling ambivalence. 
The threat erupts for a moment not as the repressed underside of everyday reality, as 
in typical horror movies, but as a result of a closer examination of its visible surface; 
the ordinary displays its continuity with the gory, and both reveal themselves as 
simply a question of scale and vantage point. A veritable object lesson in the “banality 
of evil,” the title sequence pushes the notion of the serial killer as “abnormally 
normal” (Seltzer, Serial Killers 9-10) one step further, forcing us to consider the 
abnormality of normality itself. It is not so much a question of participating in a 
“wound culture,” as Mark Seltzer has termed the “public fascination with torn and 
opened private bodies and torn and opened psyches,” the “public gathering around the 
wound and the trauma,” which he associates with the popularity of the serial killer 
(109). What is erased is not just the boundaries between the inside and the outside, 
between the scene of violence and the public convening around it, between “private 
desire and public scene” (140), as in Seltzer’s argument, but the very distinction 
between the wound and the skin. What we have here is a disclosure of the troubling 
familiarity of the wound, positioning the public as always already a part of the wound 
itself. 
The continuity between the monstrous and the ordinary, the murderous deed and 
the thoughtless everyday gesture is re-enacted throughout the story, where violence is 
pervasive, corruption is rampant, threats lie everywhere—including the family, as 
shown by Rita’s abusive former husband—, and department politics relies on 
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dishonesty and betrayal as a matter of course. The double move of the opening title 
sequence, thus, can be found everywhere: if on one side, Dexter claims for himself a 
monstrous exceptionality, on the other side he acts as a lens capable of revealing the 
more or less criminal continuum that is ordinary reality. The script, of course, 
ironically underscores this universality of violence through a hundred touches, as 
witness, for instance, the catchphrase inscribed everywhere when Dexter plays 
bowling with his colleagues in the second season: “Bowl till you bleed.” Specularly, 
Dexter the monster becomes “normalized”: over the course of the first four seasons, 
we see him gradually transformed from an asexual and emotionless fake human into 
an appropriately heterosexual lover, husband, father of a son, and devoted stepfather 
of his wife Rita’s two children. An apparently normalizing move that is in fact 
double-edged, since while on the one hand it makes it easier to like the character and 
forget his “peculiarities,” on the other hand it installs him even more firmly as the 
heart of darkness at the center of ordinary everyday life. 
What this amounts to is a multiple mirroring effect between Dexter’s “abnormal 
normality” and the normal abnormality of the surrounding world. Again and again, 
Dexter finds a specular character mirroring his own experience and inner urges—his 
long lost brother and fellow psychopathic killer in the first season, the arsonist Lila 
and the former covert operations specialist Doakes in the second, the Assistant 
District Attorney Miguel Prado in the third, Arthur Mitchell, the “Trinity killer” and 
socially respected family man, in the fourth season, Lumen in the fifth. Mirrors are 
self-awarely used as metaphors: for instance, when Dexter’s victims start surfacing 
accidentally in episode 3 of the second season, he thinks to himself that “they were 
meant to remain in the silent shadows keeping their secrets. Now they’re exposed to 
the glare, reflecting my darkness like some grotesque carnival mirror.” And finally, 
literal mirrors are planted everywhere in the series, as in the novels before them: rear 
view mirrors reflect Dexter’s masked face to his victims when he ambushes them in 
their cars, or reflect his face back to us when he is driving, virtually placing us in the 
position of back seat passengers. Incidentally, that is the position occupied by the 
inner alien urging him to kill, which is occasionally called “The Dark Passenger,” its 
constant sobriquet in the novel. The mirroring effect is thus extended to the viewer, 
installed as a secret sharer. And in a spectacular mise en abyme, the Barbie doll whose 
sawed-off body pieces tied in nice colored ribbons Dexter finds in his fridge in the 
first season—a present and a clue from his brother, the Ice Truck Killer—holds a 
mirror in her hand, in an obvious invitation to self-recognition that extends to the 
viewer thanks to the strategic placement of the camera, framing the diminutive mirror 
from Dexter’s point of view, which thus becomes identified with our own. 
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This multiple mirroring draws us into the serial killer’s world both as members of 
the “normal abnormal” everyday life and by assigning us to the uneasy position of 
partners rather than the safe one of spectators. In the mirror, interpellated as 
witnesses, participants, and not-so-reluctant accomplices, we are confronted with our 
own enjoyment of the crime scene. But what crime scene are we dealing with exactly, 
and why is it enjoyable?  
 
Short-circuiting the Symbolic Order 
From Edgar Allan Poe to Thomas Harris, the move of creating some degree of 
identification with or admiration for the criminal has been performed again and again, 
but never, I suspect, to the extent of so thoroughly enlisting the reader’s or viewer’s 
sympathies.  
As a literary, rather than literal serial killer, Dexter is a composite character 
combining theoretically incompatible figures and positions. He is a classic 
Jekyll/Hyde figure (a motif explicitly mentioned in episode 1 of the second season), 
who further reactivates a universal motif in classic detective fiction, the detective as 
the criminal’s double—Dupin and the Minister D. in “The Purloined Letter,” both 
specularly outside the normalcy of ordinary everyday society. In his daylight life as a 
crime scene specialist, he embodies the rational, scientific, technological aspect of 
investigation, as well as its state-mandated institutional aspect; in his hidden life, 
seeking clues to convict his victims, and then ambushing and capturing them, he is a 
private investigator in the hard-boiled tradition. He operates according to the 
inductive-deductive logic of the classic detective story, but he also has extra-rational 
intuitive clairvoyance based on his own inner darkness and his capacity to recognize it 
in others. He is both the producer of “false solutions”—the convincing naturalized 
scenes that divert the attention of the police—and the reader of the false solutions 
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disseminated by other criminals.
6
 He is the serial murderer, the object of 
investigation. But he is also the avenger, the omnipotent extra-legal defender fighting 
evil by way of evil and thus turning his own evil into good. What does this conflation 
mean in terms of his cultural function? Dexter faces us with something that is more 
sophisticated and infinitely more troubling than the mechanism of scapegoating 
operating in classic detective fiction. In an attempt to assess its peculiarity, I will now 
turn to the work of Slavoj Žižek, not only to profit from the theorist’s brilliance as an 
analyst of popular culture, but also because, like many recent TV series, Dexter seems 
to have been written expressly to be interpreted by Žižek.7 I will adopt a 
Lacanian/Žižekian approach tactically, as a way of elucidating some dynamics which 
I will then try to push in a different direction.
8
  
Let us start from the obvious. What the series stages is, like all detective stories, 
the emergence of the Lacanian Real—“the nonsymbolized kernel that makes a sudden 
appearance in the symbolic order, in the form of traumatic ‘returns’ and ‘answers’” 
(Žižek  39). Dexter, as a killer, is the producer of such traumatic moments, but 
simultaneously he is also the figure containing them and integrating them back into 
“normal” symbolic reality, that is, the investigator whose presence “guarantees in 
advance the transformation of the lawless sequence into a lawful sequence; in other 
words, the reestablishment of ‘normality’” (Žižek 58). This twofold position as a 
figure of control, in the tradition of classic detective fiction, and as a figure of painful 
involvement and ignorance of his own truth, as is the case with the personally 
threatened PI of the hard-boiled lineage, is formally captured by the anomalous status 
of the voice over, which is both the involved voice of the hard-boiled filmic tradition 
and the ironically detached voice of an external narrator operating in the role of “the 
subject supposed to know”—the detective or the analyst in psychoanalysis. This role, 
which for Žižek is theoretically impossible in the first person (62), since “the subject 
supposed to know” is always such for another subject (like Holmes to Watson), offers 
a further key to the character’s peculiarity: the voice’s mediation realizes a double 
transference: his own and ours. The voice over is thus the vehicle of a twofold role: 
on the one hand, it promotes our identification; on the other hand, it externalizes 
Dexter with regard to himself, enabling him to see himself from the outside, and 
putting him simultaneously in the position of the analyzed and of the analyzer. The 
peculiarity of Dexter is that he creates a constant circularity—or more precisely, a 
short-circuit—between the lawless and the lawful. What he does is reveal “the ‘inner’ 
truth … that we are murderers in the unconscious of our desire” (Žižek 59): but 
                                                 
6
 On the structurally necessary role of the “false solutions” see Žižek (54 ff.). 
7 This is not meant as a joke but quite literally: screenplay writers frequently share the same academic background 
as cultural critics or TV studies scholars. This increasing permeability between their respective worlds may well be 
one aspect of TV narratives’ increasing claim to an aesthetic status: mutual validation between producers and 
critics of art has been long recognized as a crucial move in the creation of a “field” in the Bourdieusian sense.  
8 Surprisingly enough, no Lacanian reading is offered in the essays collected in the volume Dexter and Philosophy 
(Greene, Reisch, and Robison-Greene). The volume, though, does provide a number of interesting takes on the 
first three seasons of the series, including a Burkean reading of the sublime (see Brace). For a psychoanalytic 
approach to Dexter as a character, including a reading of his sublimation processes, see Johnson.   
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whereas the traditional detective operates a scapegoating mechanism by “play[ing] 
upon the difference between the factual truth (the accuracy of facts) and the ‘inner’ 
truth concerning our desire” (59), Dexter forces us to acknowledge our involvement 
in his acts by holding to us the mirror of our own unconscious desire.
9
 
Dexter’s short-circuiting between the lawless and the lawful offers all sorts of 
different interesting connections. The first one I want to pursue, again by way of the 
insights offered by Slavoj Žižek, is the question of the relationship between the 
normal and the abnormal. In Žižek’s terms, we could describe Dexter as a staging of 
the dynamic between the big Other—that is, the rules of the social game, the 
intersubjective community, the ignorant bystander who must not know how things 
really are, the illusion structuring social reality—and what Žižek terms the “secret 
wars” going on behind its surface, under the protection of the social mask. In the first 
seasons of the series, the big Other comprises almost the totality of the characters 
(apart from Dexter) and is eminently embodied by Rita, his fiancée, whose ignorance 
of his activities constantly produces ironic effects.
10
 But as Žižek reminds us, the 
“‘outside’ is never simply a ‘mask’ we wear in public but is rather the symbolic order 
itself” (73-4): “By ‘pretending to be something,’ by ‘acting as if we were something,’ 
we assume a certain place in the intersubjective symbolic network, and it is this 
external place that defines our position” (74). In other words, at the level of the 
symbolic order, Dexter really is the responsible husband, father and pillar of the 
community that he pretends to be. What we have here is a “special kind of double 
deception” since, as Žižek puts it, “Only man can deceive by feigning to deceive” 
(73). It is on this logic of double deception, in fact, that the whole mechanism of the 
“abnormal normality” both of Dexter and of daily reality itself is hinged. This logic, 
in yet another metalinguistic twist, is repeatedly laid bare in the series, for instance in 
the course of the second season, when Dexter pretends to be concealing the secret of 
his drug addiction in order to conceal the secret of his addiction to killing, and during 
the meetings of the Narcotics Anonymous, performs as the addict that he is by making 
up a false story that is in fact his own. What is placed en abyme here is, 
simultaneously, the mutually constitutive relation of inner self and social mask, on the 
one hand, and the actual relation that the storyline entertains with its audience, on the 
other. Dexter deceives his world by feigning to be normal in order to disguise the 
monster within him, and in so doing he deceives us disguising his actual normality.
11
  
                                                 
9 Following this line of reading, Žižek’s work also offers a possible key to the character’s appeal, which would 
reside exactly in Dexter’s repeatedly denounced inner void: like the femme fatale in the hard-boiled tradition, 
discussed by Žižek, his “power of fascination masks the void of [his] nonexistence” (65) but “precisely as 
nonexisting, i.e., at the moment at which … [he] assumes [his] nonexistence, [he] constitutes himself as ‘subject’” 
(65)—“the dimension of the pure subject fully assuming the death drive” (66).  
10 The dynamic changes after Debra is exposed to her brother’s secret at the end of season 6. By the end of the 8th 
season, the character will be completely overwhelmed by the emergence of the Real and the consequent shattering 
of her known world, but Dexter’s position will prove to be equally threatened by the new porousness between his 
social and his sociopathic selves.     
11 Interestingly enough, James Manos, Jr., the character’s developer and the writer of the series pilot, in an 
interview with Douglas Howard claims that compared with the rest of the characters, “in fact, Dexter is the most 
sane of them all” and “he’s the most honest, even though he’s living a secret life” (21). 
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Žižek connects the question of the big Other to the process of “transference of 
guilt” that he analyzes with reference to Alfred Hitchcock’s films. Murder, he argues, 
is never simply between the murderer and the victim; it is always for a third party who 
does not know and refuses to know the way in which s/he is implicated in the affair 
(74). In other words, the ultimate instigator and recipient of the murderer’s act is 
always the big Other itself—the delusional fullness of the social order. In the series, 
the big Other is represented (especially in the first seasons) by virtually all characters 
apart from Dexter himself, but none of the characters embodies it more fully than 
Dexter’s fiancée and then wife, the knowing-unknowing Rita. Her lack of 
understanding of Dexter’s secret life and her naiveté in taking everything at face value 
create countless occasions for irony. But when, in season 2, she decides to throw 
away her husband’s shoe—the evidence of Dexter’s role in his imprisonment and 
eventual death, which she refuses to acknowledge—we are suddenly faced with an 
effective epitome of the wilful ignorance that grounds the very existence of the social 
world. As inhabitants of the symbolic order, we are placed, like Rita, in the position 
of third parties, the unknowing instigators or beneficiaries of Dexter’s murders. And 
yet, by staging both sides of this process, the show offers us an experience that is the 
reverse of catharsis: as viewers, we are made to move from blissful ignorance to the 
realization that, as third parties, we are always already guilty. If Dexter is, with 
respect to the symbolic order, a psychotic—in Žižek’s words, “a subject who is not 
duped by the symbolic order” (79)—with respect to Dexter we are the hysterics, 
identifying with him to accede to our own desire. 
But what is, then, the nature of this desire? This is the moment of finally tackling 
what I have called “the sublime object of justice.” 
 
Justice and the Sublime 
Slavoj Žižek defines the Sublime as the paradox of that which, in the field of 
representation, provides a view of what is unrepresentable. If, in Lacan’s description, 
the drive circulates around a lack whose only positive existence is in the form of the 
unattainable das Ding, the Thing, the sublime object is precisely the materialization of 
the Thing: “‘an object elevated to the dignity of the Thing,’ an ordinary, everyday 
object that undergoes a kind of transubstantiation and starts to function, in the 
symbolic economy of the subject, as an embodiment of the impossible Thing, i.e., as 
materialized Nothingness” (83). Žižek goes on to explain: “This is why the sublime 
object presents the paradox of an object that is able to subsist only in shadow…as 
soon as we try to cast away the shadow to reveal the substance, the object itself 
dissolves; all that remains is the dross of the common object” (83-4), since “the 
sublime quality of an object is not intrinsic, but rather an effect on its position in the 
fantasy space” (84). 
For Dexter, the function of the sublime object is performed by the code of Harry, 
the set of instructions that holds an absolute hold over him and to which he returns 
obsessively, the hidden core that endows his inner void with positive existence and 
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that makes his enjoyment possible through a positive injunction to “enjoy his 
symptom,” that is, to kill. Harry is a fantasy figure, literally appearing on stage when 
Dexter needs to make a choice, as a ghostly personification of the superego: a literal 
embodiment of the psychoanalytic lesson according to which, in order to exert 
symbolic authority, the living father must be dead. Like the sublime object, which 
changes back to ordinary when taken away from the fantasy space, the code of Harry 
runs the risk of dissolving and temporarily loses its function when Dexter, trying to 
learn about his past, finds out about Harry’s lies. Significantly, this is also the moment 
in the plot when Dexter becomes impotent to kill: by reducing Harry to an ordinary, 
self-serving person, Dexter has inadvertently undermined the sublime object’s 
authority as a transcendental ethical code, and the whole fantasy structure that gave 
him consistency and authorization falls apart, revealing the hole in the symbolic order, 
the emptiness where formerly was the Law, the superego command sustaining reality. 
What I wish to suggest is that the fantasy authorized by the code of Harry, and 
lacking which Dexter finds himself unable to satisfy his urge to kill, is exactly a 
fantasy of justice—“justice” being, not accidentally, a word that recurs everywhere 
both in the novels and in the show. Clearly reinscribing, with an ironical wink at the 
audience, Clint Eastwood’s “Dirty Harry” in Don Siegel’s eponymous film of 1971, 
Dexter’s father (played by James Remar) looks even physically like an older version 
of Inspector Callaghan, and his code is inspired by a similar notion of violence and 
extra-legal action as the best way of protecting society and enforcing justice, despite 
and beyond the limitations of the legal system. To Dexter, therefore, the code of 
Harry is not just a way of staying safe from capture and prosecution: it is what keeps 
him—in spite of, and in fact exactly by virtue of, being a serial killer—ethical, the 
thin line that separates murder from justice, lawless killing from righteous 
extrajudicial punishment. 
“You can’t be a killer and a hero, it doesn’t work like that!” cries Dexter’s 
brother in the last episode of the first season, facing him with the choice of becoming 
a lawless, and therefore a mere pleasure killer by sacrificing his sister, Debra. What 
Dexter’s brother—himself a serial killer—voices here is, paradoxically, a 
conventional, legalistic understanding of killing as outside of the precincts of the law, 
and therefore incompatible with the social mandate and recognition associated with 
heroism. But by virtue of the code of Harry, Dexter manages exactly to represent 
himself as both a killer and a hero. It is the fantasy of justice sustained by the code 
that makes him possible as a hero. This becomes utterly explicit in his final 
apotheosis, at the end of season 1, when in a metafictional fantasy, Dexter imagines 
himself as a popular hero greeted by an enthusiastic crowd of fans. The fantasy is 
reinforced in the second season, after his victims have begun to resurface and the fact 
that they all had a criminal record has been circulated in the news. This creates 
increasing popular support for the as yet unknown killer called The Bay Harbor 
Butcher, which proves deeply rewarding to Dexter. In episode 5, while investigating a 
murder in a comic bookstore, he mirrors himself in the classic superhero: “I never 
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really got the whole superhero thing, but lately it does seem we have a lot in common: 
tragic beginnings, secret identities, part human, part mutant, archenemies.”12 
Immediately after that, he sees an image of the Dark Defender, the protagonist of a 
graphic novel project inspired by the Bay Harbor Butcher, that is, himself: “stalker of 
the night, his blade of vengeance turns wrong into right.” Dexter loses himself in 
contemplation of the Dark Defender, and then dismisses the image with an ironic 
twist: “No, Miami’s too hot for all that leather.” But later in the same episode, we see 
him fantasizing about himself as the Dark Defender, rescuing his mother and himself 
as a child from her murderers. In the usual metafictional vertigo, we witness, in 
fiction, a hero modeling himself in fantasy on a fictional hero modeled after a real-life 
killer coinciding with himself. Could the intricate interconnections between fact and 
fiction be any more explicit? The episode ironically signals that in the contemporary 
world, as Mark Seltzer puts it in True Crime, “the self-modeling of society is 
premised on the media doubling of the world” (8). And what social approval for the 
Butcher’s deeds indicates is that, indeed, Dexter is operating on a social mandate, 
with the big Other standing as both instigator and beneficiary. So that the question on 
which the episode ends—“Am I the twisted Bay Harbor Butcher or the valiant Dark 
Defender?”—is really a question that we as viewers are also called upon to answer, as 
it concerns more than just the status of Dexter. Does the “blade of vengeance” really 
“turn wrong into right”?  
On a fantasy level, the answer is yes. The slippage between “defender” and 
“vengeance” is significant in this sense. In fact, Dexter does not defend anybody: 
what he does is exact retribution as a justification for satisfying his own urges.
13
 And 
yet, in the episode to which I just referred—the fantasy of himself dressed as the Dark 
Defender rescuing his mother—killing is represented as a way of retrospectively 
regaining a lost plenitude, in a complication of temporal dimensions whereby 
retribution actually becomes a fantasy of defense. In a sort of preemptive strike after 
the fact, the fantasy of redressal literally “turns wrong into right” by enacting a sort of 
counterfactual history. 
Another way of turning wrong into right, of course, is by legitimizing and 
justifying extrajudicial violence as righteous. If the fantasy that Dexter is acting out 
for us is a fantasy of omnipotent and untrammeled justice, as the parallel with the 
comic book superhero explicitly suggests, then the actual site where private and 
public desire intersect in Dexter is a vigilante notion of justice. The desire to which he 
                                                 
12 Dexter’s fantasy of himself as a comic-book hero is far from arbitrary; indeed, it is culturally revealing. Comic 
book superheroes are an important vehicle for representing and circulating notions of crime and justice within 
popular culture, and they display numerous and evident connections with the romanticized, individualistic 
vigilante figures of films and TV shows. Both present a rhetoric of retribution and an emphasis on (more or less 
graphically) violent enforcement of retributive justice. For an analysis of comic books’ portrayals of crime and 
justice and of readers’ responses to them, and of the ways in which the post-9/11 context affected comic-book 
notions of heroism, see Phillips and Strobl.    
13 It is worth noting, however, that by prevalently choosing his victims among serial killers exhibiting a 
compulsive and repeated criminal behavior, rather than one-time murderers, Dexter blurs the boundary between 
retribution and defense, creating one more element of social “justification” for his killing. 
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gives expression is a desire for taking justice in one’s own hands, sustained by a 
fantasy that pretends to endow the vigilante’s acts with an inherent lawfulness, albeit 
an extra-legal one. By making available to us both our guilty murderous desire and its 
inherent lawfulness, Dexter makes sure that “we will be able to desire without paying 
the price for it” (Žižek  59), not by scapegoating, as in classic detective fiction, but by 
reinstating the legitimacy of the desire itself. The code of Harry—that is, very 
literally, the Name of the Father, the symbolic, the Law (and it is worth recalling that 
Harry Morgan was himself a police officer)—is there to guarantee its fundamental 
righteousness.  
 
The Force of Law 
What we witness, experience, and enjoy in Dexter is a split between the Law with 
a capital letter—the symbolic order—and the law with a small one, the legal 
apparatuses and guarantees, the habeas corpus, the right to be judged by a jury. While 
Dexter himself, at least at the beginning, explicitly denounces himself as a monster 
and repeatedly questions the legitimacy of his own compulsive (albeit carefully 
disciplined) actions, other characters—representatives of the law, such as Harry 
Morgan and, in the third season, Assistant District Attorney Miguel Prado—
recurrently guarantee that Dexter is respecting the spirit of the law and merely 
contradicting its letter. What we are faced with is a troubling conceptual disjunction, 
whereby on the one hand force is disassociated from the law, reducing the latter to an 
impotent husk that is then denounced in its impotence; and on the other hand, force is 
associated with justice, in ways that evacuate justice of any significance other than the 
power of exacting retribution. What is the significance of this divorce of the legal 
from the ethical? 
Jeff Lindsay, the author of the Dexter book series, who approved and initially co-
authored the TV adaptation, discusses moral and ethical questions extensively in his 
published interviews. “Anybody who’s been a cop for longer than a week eventually 
realizes that there’s a huge gap between law and justice,” says Lindsay in a 2009 
interview with Douglas Howard (8).
14
 While insisting that he has no political agenda 
but rather “a philosophical one” (11), and that “the ethical and moral dilemmas” (12) 
are his main concern in the stories, Lindsay declares himself a fan of capital 
punishment for particularly heinous crimes: “Okay, that’s what Dexter’s doing. Now, 
he’s doing it without benefit of the courts or anything else, but that’s pretty much his 
agenda. So, whether it’s right or wrong is not something I want to come out and say. I 
would just love it if people would think about it a little” (11). Then, asked to account 
for Dexter’s success, he goes on to say: “it’s hit some primal nerve somewhere, and I 
think it’s partly because people love to see justice done. … Everybody feels that. A 
                                                 
14 Similar feelings are expressed in an interview with Luan Gaines: “Q.: Do you think part of Dexter’s appeal is the 
secret vigilantism in people’s hearts, the thirst for justice without legal trappings? A.: That’s definitely part of it. 
We’re all frustrated with our legal system, and we’ve all butted heads with the huge difference between real justice 
and legal justice. But there’s also a sense that Dexter is catching the people that slip through the cracks, and 
protecting us in ways that the cops and courts can’t.” www.curledup.com/intlinds.htm. 
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lot of us go, ‘Oh, that’s wrong. Let’s move on and not try to get blood for this.’ But 
down deep, we all want to see it done” (12).15 Clearly, the definition of “justice” 
presupposed here is of the eye-for-an-eye school. In a previous interview, Lindsay had 
gone as far as to define Dexter, thanks to the code of Harry, “an extremely moral 
individual”: 
 
Whatever it is that made Dexter a killer is not something you can argue with, and 
he would be, like a lot of sociopaths, a killer in any case. But because he has had this 
code engrained into him by his foster father, he’s an extremely moral individual, as 
long as you take situational ethics seriously, which is to say that he has earned the right 
to kill because he follows the rules that he has learned to live by. They’re very definite 
rules, and he follows them very definitely. (Quoted in Goodykoontz) 
 
An interesting element in this statement is the way in which the narrative of 
victimization and trauma—the serial killer’s typical origin story—is used unilaterally 
to represent Dexter’s compulsive murderous behavior as “not something you can 
argue with.”16 And yet, unlike Dexter, who is entitled to “enjoy his symptom,” the 
other serial killers who become his victims are never allowed to speak for themselves: 
in fact they are usually gagged and are only allowed to speak to confess. The 
implication is clear: unlike “moral” Dexter, they are rapers and paedophiles, the 
bearers of perverse desires; we are all better off without them, and we don’t care 
about their history or how they may have become what they are. Dexter, instead, “has 
earned the right to kill” because he has acquired an implicit social mandate by virtue 
of the disciplining and channeling of his impulses, whose socially useful function 
overrules the need for painstaking, time-consuming, and ultimately self-defeating 
legal procedures. This is connected to the other, really problematic point about 
situational ethics. First formulated by Episcopal minister Joseph Fletcher in the 1960s, 
situational ethics insists that moral judgments are decisions to be made contextually, 
rather than according to absolute prescriptive rules, and that the only standard of 
moral evaluation is love, that is, concern for the well-being of others. Love and justice 
coincide, and justice requires an attempt to achieve the greatest good for the greatest 
number. Popularized as a Christian version of the “end justifies the means” logic, the 
discourse of situational ethics was revived during the Bush presidency by Dick 
Cheney’s advocation of the so called “enhanced interrogation techniques”—torture—
in the superior interest of “saving American lives,” and endlessly rehearsed in the 
media, for instance in the TV shows’ recurrent “ticking bomb” scenario. This 
argument is explicitly echoed in season 2, episode 3 of Dexter, albeit without any 
                                                 
15 The moral implications of Dexter’s actions are also discussed extensively in several of the essays collected in 
Greene, Reisch, and Robison-Greene. 
16 It is interesting to note that the victim culture—once mainly connected to social marginality and victimization, 
and mocked and denounced as such by conservative books like Robert Hughes’s The Culture of Complaint (1993) 
and Alan Dershowitz’s The Abuse Excuse (1995)—now surfaces everywhere as sanction or justification of 
extralegal retribution. 
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direct reference to the Iraq war or terrorism, by FBI agent Frank Lundy (Keith 
Carradine), who defends the legitimacy of killing when innocent lives are at stake. 
Special agent Lundy is presented throughout as an authoritative, expert, and reliable 
character. Are we really meant, as spectators, to take this version of situational ethics 
seriously, and to endorse the inherent morality of killing as the lesser evil, provided 
one “follows the rules”? Whose rules, and based on whose authority?  
Part impassive technician amid his shining equipment in a carefully sanitized 
lab,
17
 part high priest in ceremonial garb performing a human sacrifice, Dexter carries 
out his tortures and killings according to a scrupulous ritual. The killing is preceded 
by a formal accusation of the captured perpetrator, followed by a moment of 
confession in perfect Foucauldian style—the prisoner confesses what the confessor 
already knows, thus subjecting him/herself to the confessor’s authority. The captives 
are surrounded by the photos of their victims, functioning in their mute presence 
simultaneously as prosecutor’s exhibits, witnesses, and audience, and signalling that 
the ritual is being enacted on their behalf. The killing thus takes on some of the 
quality of a formal trial, with the torture room transformed into a one-on-one 
courtroom. Similarly to Harry Callaghan and countless other avengers, Dexter acts as 
“a combination judge, jury, and executioner” (Maynard, Kearney, and Guimond 
175).
18
 The symbolic trial he stages positions him as an institutional agent—the “third 
party…between the offender and his victim” that, by taking over the task of 
retribution, creates the “clear break” severing “the initial tie between vengeance and 
justice” needed to overcome the individual impulse towards revenge and to “satisfy 
the moral demand of a veritable sense of justice” (Ricoeur 223). This “third party” 
position is usually occupied by the state, as the political entity which by expropriating 
individual citizens of their right to do justice by themselves, claims for itself the 
exclusive right to arbitrate among competing claims, to ascertain the truth, and to 
exact punishment for the crime.  
An implacably effective, because single-minded, version of the state, Dexter does 
not mediate between opposite interests and constitutional guarantees, but embraces 
exclusively the rights of the innocent victims, defined as exclusively in terms of 
prompt and deadly retribution. This makes him an ideal embodiment of that “fictive, 
compensatory American sense of justice,” expressed in the widespread conviction that 
“the charade of justice is in the courtroom, and the real justice is on TV,” that has 
accompanied the ongoing “shift from a justice of equity to a justice of retribution” 
(Aladjem xii, 63, 66), especially in the wake of 9/11. Dexter’s appeal as a vigilante 
superhero conveys the idea that this should be the ethical stance and the actual 
practice of the state, as well. But what if, reversing the terms of the equivalence, we 
read Dexter not as a killer taking on the prerogatives of the state, but rather as the 
                                                 
17 In the accurate arrangement of his killing space, Dexter inscribes and parodically subverts the countless scenes 
of autopsy, leading to decisive evidence about crimes, found in such popular shows as CSI, NCIS, etc.   
18 On the crucial importance of the courtroom ritual as a way of delimiting the exercise of justice from the space of 
ordinary life, see Garapon and Gewirtz.  
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state taking on the prerogatives of a killer? In other words, as a fantasy figure, Dexter 
may be less a figure of the lawless vigilante as opposed to the law-governed state, in 
the Dirty Harry tradition, than a figure of the state as a lawless vigilante—a version of 
that “governmental lawlessness” (Maynard, Kearney, and Guimond xii) to which the 
U.S. administration resorted, both domestically and internationally, in the wake of the 
events of September 11, 2001. Perhaps, then, what we have here may be another case 
of duplicitous deception, whereby the repeated designation of Dexter as exceptional 
functions exactly as a way of disguising his actual exceptionality, or rather, to 
disguise the “state of exception” as the ordinary state of the new order.19 
Treading the thin line between enactment and exposure, Dexter provides us with 
yet another version of that state of exception that has become endemic to the West in 
the age of the “Global War on Terror,” and whose ideology has kept surfacing in so 
many recent TV productions. More specifically, it provides an accurate staging of 
what Giorgio Agamben, looking back to Jacques Derrida and through him to Walter 
Benjamin, defines as “the specific contribution of the state of exception”: “the 
separation of ‘force of law’ from the law”: “a ‘state of the law’ in which, on the one 
hand, the norm is in force [vige] but is not applied (it has no “force” [forza]) and, on 
the other, acts that do not have the value [valore] of law acquire its force” (38). What 
Agamben terms “the force of law,” putting the word “law” under double erasure to 
indicate its simultaneous inscription and suspension, is a state of anomie where the 
force of law is separated from law itself, “a force of law without law (which should 
therefore be written: force-of-law)” (39). 
If the state defines itself, in Max Weber’s well-known phrase, through the 
monopoly on the use of legitimate violence, and if justice, as Ricoeur suggests, 
“cannot be entirely identified with the suppression of violence” but rather with its 
displacement “from the private sphere to the advantage of the political entity” 
(Ricoeur 225), therefore making the act of state-mandated punishment one of the 
defining prerogatives of the state’s domination, what Dexter reenacts and reclaims, 
and thus lays bare, is the original foundational violence of the state and of the state’s 
right to exact punishment, grounded in the state’s power of coercion. By claiming for 
himself the power to decide over life or death, Dexter installs himself as a sovereign 
figure, whose blade transforms “wrong into right” in the literal sense of establishing 
sovereign force as the “‘mystical’” (Agamben 39) foundation of the law, and 
therefore, as the standard of legitimacy per se transforming violence into a legitimate 
act of justice. This conceptual conflation, ingrained in post-9/11 culture and 
ceaselessly feeding a culture of vengeance, subsumes justice into violence, thus 
rendering it as a literal “sublime object”: that which exceeds representation.20 “The 
                                                 
19 My reading of Dexter as a post-9/11 fantasy of the state as vigilante diverges sharply from Schmid’s take on the 
connection between 9/11 and the renewed centrality of the serial killer figure in U.S. popular culture. Schmid reads 
the serial killer as overlapping with the figure of the terrorist, providing both a safely “domestic” and reassuringly 
nostalgic image of evil, and an economical way of demonizing the terrorist as the troubling Other.  
20 It is worth recalling that the sublime as an aesthetic and philosophical category has been associated 
with physical pain, death, and murder since the eighteenth century. Elana Gomel explores this connection 
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sublime object of justice,” thus, designates a void. A void where justice should be, or 
could take place as an event, if only we were able to reclaim different trajectories for 
our fantasies of justice. 
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